mirror of
https://github.com/getumbrel/umbrel-apps.git
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117 lines
5.2 KiB
YAML
117 lines
5.2 KiB
YAML
# EE Gateway: Umbrel app composition
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# Copyright (C) 2026 encryptedenergy.com
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# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
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#
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# Two services share ${APP_DATA_DIR}/data (mounted at /data) for file-based
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# IPC: the UI writes config.json, the worker writes state.json and packets.db.
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# They never communicate over the network, so the worker can run on the host
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# network (which it needs to reach the Bluetooth radio) while the UI stays on
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# Umbrel's app network behind app_proxy.
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#
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# Credentials are NOT passed as environment variables here. The user enters an
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# encryptedenergy.com API token once in the UI setup wizard, which writes it to
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# config.json in the shared volume; the worker reads that file every scan cycle.
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#
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# umbreld creates ${APP_DATA_DIR}/data owned by root, but both app containers
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# run as uid 1000 and so cannot write it. The init_perms service fixes ownership
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# once before the app containers start. The worker also carries a restart policy
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# so a transient Bluetooth or D-Bus error on real hardware self-heals.
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version: "3.7"
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services:
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# Umbrel's reverse proxy. It terminates Umbrel auth and forwards to the UI.
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# APP_HOST format is <app-id>_<compose-service-name>_1.
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app_proxy:
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environment:
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APP_HOST: ee-gateway_ui_1
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APP_PORT: 8080
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# One-time root init. umbreld creates the shared /data dir owned by root; both
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# app containers run as uid 1000 and cannot write it. This chowns /data to
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# 1000:1000 and exits. It reuses the already-pulled worker image so there is no
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# extra download, and it is the only place root is used. This is NOT privileged
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# mode; the app containers themselves stay non-root.
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init_perms:
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image: encryptedenergy/ee-gateway-worker:0.7.7@sha256:678688523b9357b87308aae532b8f57a0a5769eb43ad33911ad0c345220eb17b
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user: "0:0"
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entrypoint: ["sh", "-c", "chown -R 1000:1000 /data"]
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restart: on-failure
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volumes:
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- ${APP_DATA_DIR}/data:/data
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# Flask setup wizard + status dashboard. Fully unprivileged: no host network,
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# no added capabilities, no Bluetooth access. During setup it may make
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# outbound HTTPS requests to encryptedenergy.com to verify credentials.
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# Runs as uid 1000 (set in the image). init: true so SIGTERM reaches Flask
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# for a clean shutdown.
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ui:
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image: encryptedenergy/ee-gateway-ui:0.6.4@sha256:c30e4b2a2bd640005499e4fe564a04f6650b920c0726b15e2437eaa41ffb25eb
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init: true
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restart: on-failure
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depends_on:
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init_perms:
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condition: service_completed_successfully
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volumes:
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- ${APP_DATA_DIR}/data:/data
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environment:
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EE_DATA_DIR: /data
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EE_UI_PORT: 8080
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EE_GATEWAY_VERSION: "0.10.6"
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# BLE scan + GPS-stamped cloud ingest worker. It reaches the host's
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# Bluetooth radio through bluetoothd over the D-Bus system bus, talks to
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# a bundled gpsd against an optional USB GPS dongle for per-packet
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# coordinates, and makes outbound HTTPS calls to encryptedenergy.com. The
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# Python process runs as uid 1000; gpsd starts as root only to open the
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# serial device, then drops to user nobody.
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worker:
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image: encryptedenergy/ee-gateway-worker:0.7.7@sha256:678688523b9357b87308aae532b8f57a0a5769eb43ad33911ad0c345220eb17b
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init: true
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restart: on-failure
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depends_on:
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init_perms:
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condition: service_completed_successfully
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# Host networking gives the container direct use of the host Bluetooth
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# stack. Docker does not bridge BlueZ, so this is the only path that
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# exposes the host's Bluetooth radio to the container. The worker
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# makes outbound HTTPS calls only; it does not bind any LAN-facing
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# listening port. The container does run a bundled gpsd internally
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# for the optional GPS dongle, but as of worker 0.7.5 it is started
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# without -G, so it binds 127.0.0.1:2947 (loopback) only — the worker
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# reads from that same loopback, no other consumer.
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network_mode: host
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# The only privilege grant for BLE: NET_ADMIN + NET_RAW let the
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# Bluetooth stack manage and read from the radio. Deliberately NO
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# `privileged: true`, NO Docker socket, NO host filesystem write.
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cap_add:
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- NET_ADMIN
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- NET_RAW
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# USB device access for an optional GPS dongle. Two layers:
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#
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# 1) `device_cgroup_rules` grants the container permission to access
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# character devices with major 188 (USB serial, e.g. PL2303 ->
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# ttyUSB*) and 166 (CDC ACM, e.g. u-blox NEO -> ttyACM*). The
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# rule is permission only; without step 2 the device nodes are
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# not present inside the container's tmpfs /dev.
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#
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# 2) Bind-mounting the host's /dev INTO the container's /dev makes
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# the actual device nodes visible. The cgroup_rules above keep
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# the container from actually opening any device outside the
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# two allowed majors.
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device_cgroup_rules:
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- 'c 188:* rwm'
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- 'c 166:* rwm'
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volumes:
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- ${APP_DATA_DIR}/data:/data
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# D-Bus system bus, read-only: the worker speaks to the host
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# bluetoothd over the bus but never needs to write the bus directory.
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- /var/run/dbus:/var/run/dbus:ro
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# Full /dev passthrough so the GPS dongle's tty node is visible to
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# the container. Constrained to majors 188 and 166 by the
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# device_cgroup_rules above.
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- /dev:/dev
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environment:
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EE_DATA_DIR: /data
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